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Abstract
This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common pay-
ment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding.
It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both
ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate care by GPs to lead to more serious
illnesses. The results are as follows. Capitation is the payment mechanism that in-
duces the most referrals to expensive specialty care. Fundholding may induce almost
as much referrals as capitation when the expected costs of GPs care are high relative
to those of specialty care. Although driven by nancial incentives of di¤erent nature,
the strategic behaviours associated with fundholding and FFS are very much alike. Fi-
nally, whether a regulator should use one or another payment mechanism for GPs will
depend on (i) his priorities (either cost-containment or quality enhancement) which,
in turn, depend on the expected cost di¤erence between GPs care and specialty care,
and (ii) the distribution of proles (diagnostic ability and altruism levels) among GPs.
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1 Introduction
An important part of the literature on the industrial organization of health care has fo-
cused on examining patient and physician behavior in di¤erent institutional frameworks
in order to ultimately suggest policies that will encourage the e¢ cient provision of care.
Institutional frameworks are most often characterized by their insurance system and their
physician payment scheme. As patients, physicians and insurance providers are likely to
have private information and competing objectives, deriving optimal insurance plans and
physician payment schemes is complicated. Although much has been written on the topic,
the previous literature has mostly analyzed patient and physician behavior in a static
framework without gatekeeping.1
In practice, some of the most commonly used and studied payment mechanisms for
physicians are capitation, fee for service (FFS) and fundholding. The FFS mechanism,
similar to the hospitals retrospective reimbursement contracts, reimburses health care
providers for their full costs of providing health services. Although it has become less
popular, FFS remains the predominant payment system in the United States, Canada and
many European countries. The capitation scheme, similar to prospective reimbursement
for hospitals, shifts cost responsibilities to physicians as it gives the physician or a group
of physicians a periodical payment for each patient they enlist, and makes the physician
responsible for all physician costs. Capitation is well known for being used in Health
Maintenance Organizations in the US, but it is also used in other countries including
Spain and the United Kingdom. With fundholding, the principle of capitation is extended
to make physicians responsible for costs of specialized and hospital care as well. This
1 In these models (Blomqvist (1991), Ma and McGuire (1997), Blomqvist and Léger (2005)), patients
generally face a distribution of illness severity and, conditional on a particular ilness severity, decide on the
type of provider and the quantity of care to consume. Once the treatment has been provided, the patients
ex post health is revealed, payments are made and the analysis ends. One exception to this is Allard, Léger,
and Rochaix (2009) who examine patient and doctor interaction in a repeated-game framework.
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payment system was introduced in the UK in 1991 and abolished in 1998.
It is usually admitted that FFS gives no incentive to limit medical costs as the only
way that a physician can increase his income under such a system is to increase volume; it
is, however, expected to preserve the quality of physiciansservices. Conversely, capitation
is suspected to induce a lower quality and/or quantity of care as physicians may wish to
control costs in order to increase their income. Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) are among
the authors concluding so when analyzing the case of self-interested hospitals. Fundholding
is expected to contain costs even more than capitation as it is designed as a generalization
of the capitation scheme.
This paper brings important nuances to these commonly shared beliefs on physicians
payment mechanisms. The distinctive features of our approach are the following. First,
we focus on gatekeeping GPs rather than considering health care providers in general or
hospitals specically. This focus is motivated by the recent trend to force patients to
seek a referral by a GP before accessing specialty care. This pivotal role of the GPs
is expected to reduce overall specialty care costs. Second, we recognize that GPs are
heterogeneous in terms of both ability and altruism. We believe that this is not specic to
the medical profession. However, it should not be ignored when analyzing GPsresponses
to the incentives associated with their payment mechanisms. Third, we introduce dynamics
in the health production function by allowing inappropriate care by the GP to lead to more
serious illnesses.
In our model, GPs decide whether to treat or to refer a patient according to the outcome
of the diagnosis. Certain types of illnesses are diagnosed with potential error where the
diagnostic precision depends on the GPs diagnostic ability.2 The most able GPs have the
2Both Garcia-Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) and Malcomson (2004) consider incentive contracts for gate-
keeping GPs in a setting where the diagnostic precision is endogenous. Although we do not consider
endogenous precision, we acknowledge that diagnostic precision may come in part from costly e¤ort. In this
sense, the results presented here can be considered complementary to those presented by the aforementioned
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most accurate diagnosis so that they should ideally trust their judgment when deciding
between a GPstreatment and a referral to a specialist. The less able GPs should in turn
adopt a systematic behavior, depending on the priority of the regulator. If the regulators
main concern is cost containment, then the less able GPs should systematically treat their
patient before eventually referring them to the specialist, to avoid the nancial costs of
wasteful referrals. If the regulators main concern is to guarantee patientsexpected health,
then the less able GPs should systematically refer patients to more expensive and able
specialists, to avoid the health and utility costs of inappropriate treatment.
A regulator cannot realistically tell a GP how to behave because both the GPs type
(i.e., his level of altruism and diagnostic ability) and the outcome of his diagnosis are
the GPs private information. However, as usually recognized, improving e¢ ciency is an
essential part of any strategy for reconciling rising demands for health care with the need
for public budget restraint. Therefore, providing the right incentives for key actors in
the system is a pre-requisite. In that sense, a regulator may propose di¤erent nancial
incentives to induce GPsoptimal behaviors. We focus here on the incentives associated
with some of the most common GPspayment methods and present our main results on
these incentives hereafter.
The implication of focusing on gatekeeping GPs is that the incentives associated with
capitation give opposite results to those usually admitted. We show that a GP paid by
capitation is better o¤ systematically referring patients to more expensive specialized care
to avoid paying the costs of directly treating the patients, no matter his level of ability
and altruism. Overall, this referral behavior increases costs without limiting quality, even
though the costs of treatment by GPs are kept at the lowest level. This result is in line
with one already obtained by Garcia-Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) for a self-interested
authors.
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representative GP. This result is also consistent with empirical evidence, which suggested
that physicians paid on a FFS basis were less likely to refer patients than those paid by
capitation (Grembowski, Cook, Patrick, and Roussel (1998)).
Furthermore, we show that fundholding surprisingly results in GPs behaviors that
can be similar to the ones induced by FFS. To understand this similarity, it is important
to identify the link between GPsresponse to incentives and their diagnostic ability and
altruism prole. When paid on a FFS basis, the less altruistic yet able GPs have an
incentive to systematically treat their patients on their own to maximize their revenue
from fees without risking the patients health in the process. Under fundholding, those
GPs behave in the same way to economize on the expected specialist costs for which they
are held responsible. Conversely, su¢ ciently altruistic and less able GPs have an incentive
to systematically refer their patients to specialized care because they know that specialists
are better at providing the good care that they wish for their patients, no matter whether
they are paid on a FFS or fundholding basis. The remaining GPs, i.e. those with a high
diagnostic ability and a moderate sense of altruism, have an incentive to base their decision
(either treat or refer the patient) on the outcome of their rather accurate diagnosis.
Health economists are increasingly incorporating physiciansaltruism into their models,
as well as the positive inuence of altruism on the endogenous quality of care (see Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998), Jack (2005), Biglaizer and Ma (2007), Degaauw (2007), and Choné
and Ma (2011)). We complement this approach by considering that the quality of health
services has an exogenous component as well, i.e. GPs ability. Therefore, good quality care
in our model can result either from a high level of altruism (systematic referrals to good
quality specialists) or a high level of GPs ability (adequate decisions based on an accurate
diagnosis). This distinction is worth noticing because of its important implications in terms
of costs.
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Whether a regulator should use one or another mechanism to pay GPs depends on his
priorities (either cost containment or quality enhancement) as well as on the distribution
of GPs proles. The same conclusion appears in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) despite
the important di¤erences that we have now identied between hospitalsand gatekeeping
GPsoptimal responses to payment incentives. However, having no observation about the
distribution of GPs proles makes it di¢ cult to provide a clear-cut policy recommenda-
tion. To tackle this problem, Jack (2005) proposes to design a menu of non-linear contracts
relating payment to costs, to induce physicians to reveal their prole. However, in a com-
panion paper (Allard, Jelovac, and Léger (2010)), we show that self selection of a payment
mechanism is not always optimal for gatekeeping GPs who di¤er in both altruism and
ability, again depending on GPs proles and on the regulators priorities. A thorough em-
pirical analysis would be very useful to elicit the distribution of GPs proles and ultimately
provide reliable policy recommendations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we derive the ideal (First-Best) GPs treatment and referral decisions as a
function of his diagnostic ability. In Section 4 we analyze how di¤erent types of GPs
(with respect to their altruism and diagnostic ability) are likely to respond in terms of
treatment and referral decisions to three common forms of payment mechanisms: (i) FFS,
(ii) capitation, and (iii) fundholding. In this section, we also compare the GPs behavior
under each of these payment mechanisms to those derived in the First Best. In Section 5, we
compare the behavior of each type of GP across the three types of payment mechanisms in
order to identify if and when a particular payment mechanism yields the First-Best outcome
and/or provides better incentives than any other. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
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2 The Model
In this section we introduce a simple model where GPs act as gatekeepers to specialty care
and must decide whether to treat their patient or refer them to specialty care. In our model,
individuals may su¤er from di¤erent illness severities. The treatment protocol, however,
may not be obvious for all types of illnesses. That is, individuals with di¤erent types of
illnesses requiring di¤erent types of treatments may exhibit the same set of symptoms (for
example, skin spots which may or may not be cancerous). If a GP fails to refer a severely
ill patient to the specialist (for example, fails to refer a patient with skin cancer to the
oncologist), then the patients health may deteriorate, potentially requiring more invasive
and expensive care in the future. If the GP refers a relatively mild case to the specialist (for
example, refers a patient with simple skin spots to the oncologist), unnecessary expenses
will be incurred without improving the patients health or utility. To allow for such a
situation, we consider two types of illnesses which are diagnosed with potential error and
where the physicians ability to di¤erentiate between them depends on his diagnostic ability.
The decision to refer patients to specialty care will obviously depend on the GPs diagnostic
ability (i.e., the ability to di¤erentiate between illnesses with similar symptoms), the GPs
level of altruism, and the institutional framework.3
We next present the timing of a two-period model while specifying the patientsand
physiciansobjective functions.
2.1 The Timing
The First Period:
Stage 1 - Physician Payments and Patient Insurance:
3Other papers on GP contracting and gatekeeping have also considered the role of GPs in recommending
on particular type of specialty care among many possibilities (Brekke, Nuscheler, and Straume (2007),
Levaggi and Rochaix (2007)).
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All physician payments and insurance parameters are contracted upon, where  denotes
the actuarially fair insurance premium. In our model, we assume that patients are fully
insured and always follow their physicians recommendations.4 ;5
Stage 2 - Nature Plays:
The patient su¤ers from an illness severity M which takes on two values with corre-
sponding probabilities: a minor conditionML with probability p or a severe conditionMH
with probability (1  p):
Stage 3 - The Diagnostic Signal:
The GP is assumed to receive a costless yet noisy diagnostic signal which is a function
of his diagnostic ability a 2 12 ; 1.6 More specically, we assume that the quality of the
diagnostic signal, SL or SH , is increasing in the GPs diagnostic ability a, where:
Pr(SLjML) = a
Pr(SH jML) = 1  a
Pr(SH jMH) = a
Pr(SLjMH) = 1  a:
That is, given a diagnostic ability a and a true illness severity ML, the GP receives the
correct diagnostic signal SL with probability a while receiving the incorrect diagnostic
signal SH with probability (1  a): Similarly, given a diagnostic ability a and a true illness
severity MH , the GP receives the correct diagnostic signal SH with probability a while
receiving the incorrect diagnostic signal SL with probability (1   a): Notice that when
4Ex-post moral hazard is non-existent and co-payments are unnecessary.
5We make this simplifying assumption (that patients are passive) to abstract from demand-side incentives
and highlight supply-side ones. See Gonzalez (2010) for an example where this assumption is relaxed and
the role of patientsinformation about their own health is recognized in the analysis of GP decisions.
6For simplicity, we assume that diagnosis is e¤ortless for GPs. It is however without loss of generality
since the accuracy of the diagnosis is exogenous here.
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a = 12 , the diagnostic signal contains no information, whereas when a = 1; the diagnostic
signal is perfect (i.e., physicians work in a perfect information setting).
Further notice that by using Bayesrule we can dene the probability that the patient
su¤ers from a particular illness severity given a specic diagnostic signal as a function of
the physicians diagnostic ability:
Pr(MLjSL) = papa+(1 p)(1 a)
Pr(MH jSL) = (1 p)(1 a)pa+(1 p)(1 a)
Pr(MH jSH) = (1 p)ap(1 a)+(1 p)a
Pr(MLjSH) = p(1 a)p(1 a)+(1 p)a :
Stage 4 - Treatment and Referral Decisions:
Following his diagnosis which may be more or less accurate the GP must decide on
a course of action. We assume that each illness severity is associated with an appro-
priate treatment T , where the appropriate treatment for ML (respectively, MH) is TL
(respectively, TH): We further assume that the GP can provide the treatment TL whereas
specialists can provide both treatments TL and TH .
Given the diagnostic signal (SL or SH), the GP must decide on whether to treat his
patient with TL or refer her to the specialist. If the patient is referred to specialty care,
the specialist can either treat her with TL or TH . Finally, we assume that the specialists
diagnostic ability is perfect and that he always provides the appropriate treatment. That
is, the specialist is assumed to behave non-strategically.
The Second Period:
We introduce dynamics into the health production function by allowing for inappropri-
ate treatment by the GP to lead to more serious illnesses. More specically, we assume
that an individual su¤ering from illness severity MH but treated inappropriately by her
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GP with TL sees her illness severity worsen in the following period (an illness severity
which can only be treated by the specialist).
Formally, if the patient received the appropriate treatment in Period 1 (i.e., TL for
ML or TH for MH), then the patients health remains the same and no action is taken in
the second period. If, however, the patient received an inappropriate treatment in Period
1 (i.e., TL for MH), then she enters the second period with a deteriorated health and
is referred to the specialist for treatment. More specically, the inappropriate treatment
implies a health loss L for the patient and further treatment costs. L may include pain
and su¤ering, and can also be thought of as the "expected" health loss under inappopriate
care.
2.2 The Patient and PhysiciansPreferences:
The patients one period utility function is given by:
U = u(h M + T ) + I   ;
where u(:) denotes the utility the patient derives from health, h denotes the initial health
status, I denotes the state-independent income, and  denotes the actuarially fair insurance
premium.7 We assume that u0(:) > 0 and u00(:) < 0:
The GPs one period utility function is given by:8
VGP (T ) = RGP (T )  cGP (T ) + u(h M + T );
7We assume a separable utility function to make things more tractable. However, the qualitative results
do not depend on this assumption.
8Because of the full-insurance assumption, the patients income is invariant to the illness severity and
treatment. Consequently, adding the patients entire utility into the physicians utility function (instead of
only the patients utility from health) would not change the results.
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where RGP (T ) denotes the GPs payment for treating the patient with T and where cGP (T )
denotes the GPs cost of providing treatment T: Furthermore,  2 [0; 1] denotes the weight
the GP puts on the patients utility from health (i.e., the altruism parameter).9
We assume that the GP can treat the patient with TL at cost cGP (TL) whereas special-
ists are assumed to provide TL and TH at costs cSP
 
TL

and cSP
 
TH

, respectively.10 We
also assume that cGP (TL) < cSP (TL) and that cSP (TL) = cSP (TH): The rst assumption
is made to reect the fact that specialists use more sophisticated and expensive technolo-
gies to diagnose and treat patients than their GP counterparts.11 The second assumption
is made to reect the fact that for a variety of treatments (TL and TH), the di¤erences in
treatment costs for specialty care are likely to be small given the large up-front costs (such
as diagnostic testing). We further assume that all agents face a common discount factor
given by . Finally, we make the natural assumption that it is better to be appropriatly
treated than to be inappropriatly treated and su¤er from a health loss L. Collectively,
these assumptions translate into conditions:
(1+)u(h ML+TL)  (1+)u(h MH+TH) > u(h MH+TL)+u(h MH L+TH):
3 First Best
In this section, we derive the GPstreatment and referral decisions which maximize the
patients expected utility subject to the GPsparticipation constraint and assuming that
the GPs diagnostic ability a is known - what we call the First Best. Doing so is consis-
9Thus, a physician with  = 1 weighs equally his patients utility from health and his own revenue.
Although a physician could weigh his patients health greater than his own income (i.e., have a  > 1) we
do not consider such a case.
10We allow costs of treatment to include the physicians time and e¤ort.
11This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence provided by the studies of Greeneld (1992) and
Carey (1995).
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tent with a model where patients can write physician-type-and-state-contingent contracts,
essentially forcing the hand of their physicians based on their diagnostic ability and diag-
nosis. Although such a contract is infeasible, it can serve as a benchmark to which we can
compare physician behaviour (i.e., treatment and referral decisions) under di¤erent pay-
ment mechanisms (i.e., feasible contracts). In order to just satisfy the GPsparticipation
constraint, GPspayment will be set equal to the cost of providing the treatment (i.e.,
RGP (T
L) = cGP (T
L)):
Next we derive the First-Best treatment and referral strategies for a GP who observes
a diagnostic signal S that can either be SL (signaling a relatively mild illness) or SH
(signaling a relatively severe illness), respectively. These cases will be discussed in Lemmas
1 and 2, respectively.
Lemma 1: To maximize the patients expected utility subject to the GPs participation
constraints, a GP who observes a diagnostic signal SL should treat the patient with TL
(should refer the patient to the specialist) if and only if his diagnostic ability:
a  (<) (1  p)B
pA+ (1  p)B ;
where
A  cSP (TL)  cGP (TL);
and
B  (1 + )u(h MH + TH)  cSP (TH)
  u(h MH + TL) + u(h MH   L+ TH)  cGP (TL)  cSP (TH) :
Proof : see Appendix 1.
Note that A is the cost di¤erence between having the GP and the specialist treat with
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TL when the patient su¤ers fromML (i.e., the relatively mild illness). B; on the other hand,
is the di¤erence in the patients net expected utility between seeking care directly from the
specialist and seeking care from a GP, when she su¤ers fromMH (i.e., the relatively severe
illness), which is increasing in L. Thus pA can be thought of as the weighted marginal
benet of treatment by a GP when su¤ering fromML (relative to treatment by a specialist)
whereas (1   p)B can be thought of as the weighted marginal benet of seeking specialty
care when su¤ering from MH (relative to treatment by a GP) net of expected costs. We
have that A > 0 because we reasonably assume that specialists costs are higher than GPs
costs. Furthermore, we assume that B > 0 to account for the fact that an expensive and
appropriate treatment is preferred to an inexpensive and inappropriate treatment.
From the above, we can show that as the probability p (i.e., the probability that the
patient su¤ers from ML) increases (decreases), the minimum diagnostic ability level for
which GPs should treat with TL rather than refer the patient to specialty care will decrease
(increase). Furthermore, as the cost di¤erential associated with the treatment with TL by
a GP and a specialist decreases (increases), the minimum diagnostic ability level for which
GPs should treat the patient with TL rather than refer to the specialist will increase
(decrease).
Lemma 2: To maximize the patients expected utility subject to the GPs participation
constraints, a GP who observes a diagnostic signal SH should refer the patient to the
specialist (treat with TL) if and only if his diagnostic ability:
a  (<) pA
pA+ (1  p)B
Proof: see Appendix 2.
We can also show that as the probability (1  p) (i.e., the probability that the patient
su¤ers from MH) increases (decreases), the minimum diagnostic ability level for which
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GPs should refer the patient to specialty care rather than treat with TL will decrease
(increase). Furthermore, as the marginal benet of seeking specialty care when su¤ering
from MH relative to treatment by the GP decreases (increases), the minimum diagnostic
ability for which GPs should refer the patient to specialty care rather than treat with TL
will increase (decrease).
The decision rule:
Given the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, we can now present the GPs First-Best treat-
ment and referral decisions as a function of the diagnostic signal and exogenously given
values of A; B; p and (1   p): The GPs First-Best treatment and referral decisions are,
however, dependent on whether pA > (1 p)B or pA < (1 p)B which is also exogenously
determined: Recall that A is the marginal benet of treatment by a GP (relative to treat-
ment by a specialist) when the patient su¤ers from a relatively mild illness (ML), and that
B is the marginal benet of seeking specialty care (relative to care by a GP) when the
patient su¤ers from a relatively severe illness (MH): Consequently, if a patient who su¤ers
fromML is sent to specialty care rather than being treated by the GP, what we dene as a
Type I error, she su¤ers a loss of A: Furthermore, if a patient who su¤ers from MH is not
sent to specialty care, what we dene as a Type II error, then she su¤ers a loss of B: Thus,
if pA > (<) (1   p)B, it is worse in expected utility terms to make a Type I (Type II)
error than a Type II (Type I) error. We henceforth refer to the cases where pA > (1  p)B
(a situation where concerns of wasteful referrals dominate concerns of under referrals) and
pA < (1 p)B (a situation where concerns of under referrals dominate concerns of wasteful
referrals) as Scenarios I and II, respectively.
Scenario I (Scenario II) is likely to occur, when: (i) the costs associated with specialty
care are relatively large (small), and/or (ii) the likelihood of a relatively severe illness (MH)
is low (high). Given that the results derived throughout depend on whether pA > (1 p)B
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or pA < (1  p)B, we summarize the di¤erent scenarios in the following table (Table 1) for
easy reference.
Table 1:
Scenario I Concerns of wasteful referrals dominate Better to make a Type II error
pA > (1  p)B concerns of under referrals than a Type I error
Scenario II Concerns of under referrals dominate Better to make a Type I error
pA < (1  p)B concerns of wasteful referrals than a Type II error
Proposition 1: Under Scenario I:
(i) a GP with a diagnostic ability a 2
h
1
2 ;
pA
pA+(1 p)B
i
should always treat with TL
irrespective of his diagnostic signal (i.e., he should ignore his diagnostic signal);
(ii) a GP with a diagnostic ability a 2
h
pA
pA+(1 p)B ; 1
i
should always follow his
diagnostic signal (i.e., should treat the patient with TL when he receives a diagnostic signal
SL and refer the patient to specialty care when he receives a diagnostic signal SH):
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Proposition 2: Under Scenario II:
(i) a GP with a diagnostic ability a 2
h
1
2 ;
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B
i
should always refer the patient
to the specialist irrespective of his diagnostic signal (i.e., he should ignore his diagnostic
signal);
(ii) a GP with a diagnostic ability a 2
h
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B ; 1
i
should always follow his
diagnostic signal (i.e., should treat the patient with TL when he receives a diagnostic signal
SL and refer the patient to specialty care when he receives a diagnostic signal SH).
Proof: See Appendix 4.
Hereafter, a denotes the rst-best threshold values of the GPs ability under scenarios
I and II, i.e., a = MaxfpA;(1 p)BgpA+(1 p)B :
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From Propositions 1 and 2, we can see that low-ability GPs should adopt a systematic
strategy of either always treating the patient with TL or always referring the patient to the
specialist, whereas high-ability GPs should follow their diagnostic signal. Which systematic
strategy the low-ability GP should adopt will depend on whether it is worse in expected
utility terms for a GP to refer a patient who su¤ers from ML rather than treat her with
TL (a Type I error) or treat with TL a patient who su¤ers from MH rather than refer her
to specialty care (a Type II error):12
Notice that, irrespective of the scenario, a GP with perfect diagnostic ability (i.e., a = 1)
should always follow his diagnostic signal. Consequently, when the GPs diagnostic ability
is perfect and he follows his diagnostic signal, the patient always receives the appropriate
treatment.
4 Physician Payment Mechanisms
In the three subsections below, we derive the GPs treatment and referral behavior which
maximizes his expected utility under three common payment mechanisms: (i) fee-for-
service, (ii) capitation, and (iii) fundholding, assuming that the patient is fully insured.
We then compare the results derived under these physician payment mechanisms with full
insurance to those derived in the First Best.13 ;14
12 If the costs of specialty care were not higher than the costs of treatment by GPs (CGP (TL) = CSP (TL);
implying A = 0 and a = 1), then Scenario II holds and all GPs should systematically refer their patient
to a specialist. In this extreme case, there would be no rationale for GP gatekeeping.
13Although mixed-payment systems (i.e., payment mechanisms which are part capitation, part fee for
service) are both common in theory and in practice, we do not consider them here because care is consid-
ered uni-dimensional in our model. Generally, mixed-payment systems are considered in a multi-tasking
environment (where care depends on both an observable component and unobservable physician e¤ort). See
Allard, Léger, and Rochaix (2009) and Ma and McGuire (1997) for examples of multitasking in healthcare
and the use of mixed-payment systems.
14One should recognize that di¤erences that are uncovered reect both: (i) the strategic behavior induced
by the payment mechanism, and (ii) the fact that GPs utility does not include the costs of treatment
borne by the patient (i.e., we assume a paternalistic form of altruism where the GP only cares about his
patients health and not the externality that his behavior may have on the patients insurance premium at
16
In the following subsections, we continue to assume that the GP acts as the patients
gatekeeper to specialty care. We further assume that the patient is passive and that all
care decisions are taken by the patients physicians.
4.1 Fee for service
In the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) system, physicians are paid a xed rate for each
service they provide. These treatment-dependent rates are typically above their marginal
costs. As a result, we assume that the GPs payment under FFS is given by:15
RGP (T
L) > cGP (T
L):
We now solve for the GPs expected utility maximizing treatment and referral decisions
as a function of his private signals, his diagnostic ability as well as his level of altruism.
The GPs expected utility maximizing decisions as a function of the diag-
nostic signal:
(i) SL :
If the GP receives a diagnostic signal SL, he knows that with probability pa=(pa+(1 
p)(1   a)) the patient su¤ers from ML (the diagnosis is correct) while with probability
(1 p)(1 a)=(pa+(1 p)(1 a)) the patient su¤ers fromMH (the diagnosis is incorrect):
Whether the GP will follow his signal SL and treat the patient with TL or ignore it and
refer the patient to specialty care, will depend on the expected benets of following each
of these strategies - which in turn will depend on his diagnostic ability a; and his altruism
parameter :
If the GP follows his diagnostic signal (or, equivalently, treats with TL), his expected
equilibrium).
15We assume that the GP only earns the fee when he provides a treatment TL: We implicitely assume
that the GPs diagnostic activity is e¤ortless and that the GP is not compensated for it.
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utility is:
pa
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)fRGP (T
L)  cGP (TL) + (1 + )u(h ML + TL)g+
(1  p)(1  a)
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)fRGP (T
L)  cGP (TL) + (u(h MH + TL) +
u(h MH   L+ TH))g:
If instead the GP ignores his diagnostic signal and refers the patient to specialty care, his
expected utility is:
pa
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)(1 + )u(h M
L + TL) +
(1  p)(1  a)
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)(1 + )u(h M
H + TH):
Thus, the GP will follow his signal and treat with TL rather than refer the patient to
specialty care if his diagnostic ability16
a >
(1  p)(n m)  RGP (TL)  cGP (TL)	
(1  p) f(n m)  [RGP (TL)  cGP (TL)]g+ pfRGP (TL)  cGP (TL)g  ea2,
where
n  (1 + )u(h MH + TH);
and
m  u(h MH + TL) + u(h MH   L+ TH):
16Note that ea2 is increasing in  and concave where ea2 < 1 for all values of  and ea2 = 12 when
 = (RGP (T
L) cGP (TL))
(1 p)(n m)  e.
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Notice that more altruistic GPs will require more precision in their diagnosis before
following their diagnostic signal rather than referring their patients to specialty care. This
is simply because referring their patients to specialty care is always weakly preferred by the
patient while treating is always more lucrative for the GP. Thus, a more altruistic GP will
be less willing to trade his own welfare for his patients and thus requires a more precise
diagnosis in order to follow it.
(ii) SH :
It can also be shown that, if the GP receives a diagnostic signal SH , the GP will follow
his diagnostic signal and refer the patient to specialty care rather than treat with TL if his
diagnostic ability17 ;18
a >
pfRGP (TL)  cGP (TL)g
(1  p) f(n m)  [RGP (TL)  cGP (TL)]g+ pfRGP (TL)  cGP (TL)g  ea3:
Recall that under a FFS system, treating patients is more lucrative than referring them
to specialty care. As a result, less altruistic GPs require more precision in their diagnosis
to follow their diagnostic signal, that is, to refer their patients to specialty care when they
receive a diagnostic signal SH .
Using the above results and the properties of ea2 and ea3, we summarize the GPs ex-
pected utility maximizing strategies in Figure A.
[Insert Figure A Here]
Notice that when the GP receives a particular diagnostic signal S (either SL or SH);
he will systematically treat the patient if ea2 < a < ea3; he will follow his diagnostic signal
if a > maxfea2;ea3g; and he will systematically refer the patient if ea3 < a < ea2: In general,
17Note that ea3 is decreasing in  and convex where ea3 < 1 i¤  > (RGP (TL) cGP (TL))(n m) , and ea3 = 12 when
 = (RGP (T
L) cGP (TL))
(1 p)(n m)  e:
18RGP (T
L)  cGP (TL) > 0 assures that  > 0 when ea3 = 1 is satised under both scenarios.
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very selsh FFS GPs will wish to always treat their patients as this strategy is income
maximizing. On the other hand, relatively altruistic FFS GPs who also have relatively low
levels of diagnostic ability will systematically refer their patients to specialty care as they
care enough for them not to risk a wrong diagnosis and consequently a potentially bad
outcome.
Further notice that, under the FFS system, RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) is an important nan-
cial incentive which also determines the GPs equilibrium strategies. As RGP (TL) cGP (TL)
increases, income becomes more important to the GP relative to the patients utility. As
a result, GPs will be more inclined to treat their patients and less inclined to refer them
to specialists. Graphically, this increase in RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) shifts curves ea2 and ea3 to
the right. Conversely, as RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) decreases, GPs will be less inclined to treat
their patients and more inclined to refer them to specialists. Graphically, this decrease in
RGP (T
L)  cGP (TL) shifts curves ea2 and ea3 to the left.
Finally, notice that very selsh GPs will not be willing to follow their diagnostic signal
even in the presence of a perfect diagnostic ability (i.e., a = 1). This is simply because
systematically treating with TL is income maximizing. On the other hand, very altruistic
GPs will not all systematically refer their patients to specialty care as the ones with a
relatively high level of diagnostic ability will follow their diagnostic signal. This is simply
because in our model a GP with  = 1 weighs equally the utility from his income and his
patients utility from health.
Comparing the FFS equilibrium to the First Best:
Scenario I: pA > (1  p)B
In Figure B, we provide the FFS equilibrium strategies derived above and the First-
Best treatment and referral decisions for the scenario where it is worse, in expected utility
terms, to send a patient who su¤ers from a relatively mild illness (ML) to the specialist
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than it is to fail sending a patient who su¤ers from a relatively severe illness (MH) to the
specialist (or equivalently, it is worse in expected utility terms to make a Type I error than
a Type II error). Notice that the FFS equilibrium strategies coincide with the First Best
in two regions. In the rst region, when the GP is relatively selsh and has a generally
low diagnostic ability (i.e., a < minfa;ea3g); both the FFS and First-Best strategies are to
systematically treat the patient with TL: The FFS equilibrium coincides with the First Best
in this region simply because: (i) very selsh GPs will wish to hoard all patients (i.e., always
treat with TL) as this maximizes their income, and (ii) GPs with relatively low diagnostic
ability should always treat with TL irrespective of their diagnostic signal. Furthermore, this
region becomes bigger as the nancial reward of treatment RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) increases.
In the second region, when the GPs altruism and diagnostic ability are both relatively
high (or, equivalently, a > maxfa;ea2;ea3g), both the FFS and First-Best strategies are
to follow the diagnostic signal. The FFS equilibrium coincides with the First Best in this
region simply because: (i) relatively altruistic GPs with a relatively high diagnostic ability
can trust their diagnostic signal, and (ii) GPs with relatively precise diagnostic ability
should always follow their diagnostic signal. However, this region may become smaller as
the nancial reward of treatment RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) increases.
It is also interesting to consider the regions where the FFS outcomes do not coincide
with the First Best. In the area labelled by (-), the GPs First-Best strategy is to always
follow his diagnostic signal. However, in this region the FFS GP will always treat with
TL as he is relatively selsh. Thus, such FFS GPs under-refer their patients to specialty
care. Furthermore, this area becomes bigger as RGP (TL)   cGP (TL) increases. In the
area labelled by (+) and where a < a, the GPs First-Best strategy is to always treat the
patient with TL; however, the FFS GP will always follow his diagnostic signal. Thus, in
this area, the GP will over-refer his patients to specialty care. In the area labelled by (+)
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and where a > a, the GPs First-Best strategy is to follow his diagnostic signal whereas
such a FFS GP will always refer his patients to specialty care. Thus, in this area, the
GP will over-refer his patients to specialty care. Finally, in the area labelled by (++),
the GPs First-Best strategy is to always treat with TL (because his diagnostic ability
is imprecise), while the FFS GP will always refer the patient to the specialist (because
his diagnostic ability is imprecise and he is relatively altruistic). Thus, in this area, GPs
will greatly over-refer their patients to the specialist. However, the areas labelled (+) and
a > a or (++) become smaller as RGP (TL)   cGP (TL) increases or may even vanish if
RGP (T
L)  cGP (TL) is large enough.
[Insert Figure B Here]
Scenario II: pA < (1  p)B
In Figure C, we provide a similar analysis as in Figure B but for the scenario where
it is better, in expected utility terms, to send a patient who su¤ers from a relatively mild
illness (ML) to the specialist than to treat with TL a patient who su¤ers from a relatively
severe illness (MH) (or equivalently, it is worse, in expected utility terms, to make a
Type II error than a Type I error): Notice that the FFS and the First-Best outcomes
coincide in two di¤erent regions. As in Scenario I, the FFS GP with a relatively high
altruistic parameter and a relatively high diagnostic ability (i.e., a > maxfa;ea2;ea3g) will
follow his diagnostic signal, and this strategy coincides with the First Best. However,
again, this area may become smaller as RGP (TL)   cGP (TL) increases. In the second
region, where the GP is relatively altruistic and has a relatively low diagnostic ability (i.e.,
a < minfa;ea2g), the FFS GP will always refer the patient to specialty care. This coincides
with the First Best as GPs who have relatively low diagnostic ability should systematically
refer patients to specialty care (because it is worse from an expected utility standpoint
to make a Type II error rather than a Type I error). However, again, this area becomes
22
smaller as RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) increases or may even disappear if RGP (TL)  cGP (TL) is
large enough.
Under Scenario II, compairing the FFS equilibrium strategies to the First-Best treat-
ment and referral decisions also provides the regions where the outcomes do not coincide.
In the two areas labelled (-) the FFS GP under-refers the patient to specialty care, whereas
he greatly under-refers in the area labelled (- -) and over-refers in the area labelled (+).
[Insert Figure C Here]
Recall that under Scenario I, it is worse to make a Type I error than it is to make a
Type II error. As such, over referrals should especially be avoided where the over referrals
are associated with relatively unable yet relatively altruistic GPs. Furthermore recall that
under Scenario II, it is worse to make a Type II error than it is to make a Type I error. As
such, insu¢ cient referrals should especially be avoided where under referrals are associated
with relatively selsh GPs.
4.2 Capitation
In this section, we turn our attention to deriving the GPs expected utility maximizing
treatment and referral decisions assuming that he is paid by capitation. In such a system,
the GP receives a xed payment KGP for each patient he treats without any marginal
reimbursement. We continue to assume that the specialist behaves non-strategically.
We now solve for the GPs expected utility maximizing treatment and referral decisions
as a function of his diagnostic signals, his diagnostic ability as well as his level of altruism.
The GPs expected utility maximizing decisions as a function of the diag-
nostic signal:
The GP will always refer the patient to specialty care irrespective of the diagnostic
signal because KGP > KGP   cGP (TL): Also, notice that the GPs strategy is invariant
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to his patients true illness, his diagnostic signal and his level of altruism. This is simply
because (i) fully insured patients always weakly prefer to be sent to the specialist and (ii)
sending the patient to the specialist is both income and utility (through the altruism e¤ect)
maximizing. Thus, even a selsh GP treats and refers in a manner which is in line with
the patients preferences. Furthermore, recall that a patient who su¤ers from ML (MH),
will receive the appropriate treatment TL (TH) from the specialist.
Comparing the capitation equilibrium to the First Best:
We now compare the GPs expected utility maximizing treatment and referral decisions
under capitation to those derived in the First Best. As before, we must distinguish between
the two di¤erent scenarios.
Scenario I: pA > (1  p)B
Recall that under this scenario, GPs with a relatively low diagnostic ability (i.e., a < a)
should in the First Best systematically treat their patients with TL (because it is worse
from an expected utility standpoint to make a Type I error rather than a Type II error),
whereas GPs with a relatively high diagnostic ability (i.e., a > a) should follow their
diagnostic signal. Under capitation, GPs will systematically refer their patients to the
specialist. Thus, under this scenario, the GPs strategy never coincides with the First
Best. More specically, capitated GPs with high diagnostic ability (a > a) will over-refer
their patients to specialty care, while capitated GPs with low diagnostic ability (a < a)
will greatly over-refer their patients to specialty care.
Scenario II: pA < (1  p)B
Recall that under this scenario; a GP with a relatively low diagnostic ability (i.e.,
a < a) should in the First Best systematically refer their patients to specialty care (because
it is worse from an expected utility standpoint to make a Type II error rather than a Type
I error), whereas GPs with a relatively high diagnostic ability (i.e., a > a) should follow
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their diagnostic signal. Under capitation, GPs will systematically refer their patients to the
specialist. Thus, under this scenario, the strategy of GPs with a relatively low diagnostic
ability (a < a) will coincide with the First Best, whereas GPs with a relatively high
diagnostic ability (a < a) will over-refer their patients to specialty care.
In general, capitation payment systems provide too much incentive for GPs to refer
patients to specialty care. Nonetheless, this tendency to over-refer is particularly important
(and should be avoided) when it is worse to make a Type I error than a Type II error, i.e.,
when concerns of wasteful referrals dominate concerns of under referrals.
4.3 Fundholding
In this section we examine a more comprehensive form of the capitation payment system,
sometimes known as a fundholding system, whereby the GP receives a xed-payment KGP
for enlisting a patient into his practice but is then responsible for providing the patient with
care as neededwhile also paying for all other care consumed by the patient, including
specialty care, without any marginal reimbursement.19
We next solve for the GPs expected utility maximizing treatment and referral decisions
as a function of his private signals, his diagnostic ability as well as his level of altruism.
The GPs expected utility maximizing decisions as a function of the diag-
nostic signal:
(i) SL :
If the GP receives a diagnostic signal SL, it can be shown that the GP will follow his
diagnostic signal and treat with TL rather than refer the patient to specialty care if his
19Fundholding refers to a payment scheme that existed in the United Kingdom in which practices re-
ceived a budget for each patient they enlisted that covered non-emergency elective surgical procedures, all
laboratory tests and out-patient visits, drugs prescribed by the practice, and sta¤ costs (Matsagaris and
Glennerster (1994)).
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diagnostic ability
a >
(1  p)B0
pA+ (1  p)B0  ba2:
where B0 = (n m)  cSP (TH)  cGP  TL+ cSP (TH)	 :20
(ii) SH :
If the GP receives a diagnostic signal SH , it can be shown that the GP will refer the
patient to specialty care (i.e., follow his diagnostic signal in this case) rather than treat
with TL if his diagnostic ability 21 ;22
a >
pA
pA+ (1  p)B0  ba3:
Using the above results and the properties of ba2 and ba3, we summarize the GPs ex-
pected utility maximizing strategies in Figure D.
[Insert Figure D Here]
When the GP receives a diagnostic signal S; he will systematically treat the patient if
ba2 < a < ba3; he will follow his diagnostic signal if a > maxfba2;ba3g; and he will systemat-
ically refer the patient if ba3 < a < ba2. Similarities with the FFS system appear and are
discussed below.
Notice that, under the fundholding system, the expected cost di¤erence cSP (TH)  
cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

is an important nancial incentive for the GP which also
determines the GPs equilibrium strategies. It represents the cost di¤erence between having
the patient referred to the specialist and treated with TH ; and having the patient treated by
20Note that ba2 is increasing in  and concave where ba2 < 1 for all values of  and ba2 = 1=2 when
 =
cSP (T
H ) [cGP (TL)+(1 p)cSP (TH )]
(1 p)(n m)  b:
21Note that ba3 is decreasing in  and convex where ba3 < 1 i¤  > cSP (TH ) [cGP (TL)+cSP (TH )]n m ; andba3 = 12 when  = cSP (TH ) [cGP (TL)+(1 p)cSP (TH )](1 p)(n m)  b:
22Note that as in the Capitation case, the GPs utility maximizing behavior is independent of the up-front
payment.
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the GP with TL and then by the specialist with TH :As cSP (TH) 

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

increases, the cost of referring becomes relatively more important for the GP than the ex-
pected cost of treating. As a result, GPs will be more inclined to treat their patients (and
thus pay the expected cost

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

) than to refer their patients (and
thus pay cSP (TH)). Graphically, this increase in cSP (TH) 

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

shifts both curves ba2 and ba3 to the right. This is similar to what we obtain in the FFS
case, although the nancial incentive is of a di¤erent nature. Conversely, as cSP (TH)  
cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

decreases, GPs will be less inclined to treat their patients
and more inclined to refer them to specialists. Graphically, this decrease in cSP (TH)  
cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

shifts both curves ba2 and ba3 to the left. Again, this is similar
to what we obtain in the FFS case. Finally, if cSP (TH)  

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

becomes negative (for example, if cGP becomes very high and/or the di¤erence between cSP
and cGP is non-signicant), GPs have very little nancial incentive to treat their patients.
Consequently, the nancial incentive added to the GPs altruism will lead to a case where
the GPs equilibrium strategies are very similar to those of the capitation system. Notice,
however, that no incentive could give rise to such a case under the FFS system.
Not surprizingly, if the FFS nancial incentives (RGP cGP ) are similar to the fundhold-
ing nancial incentives (cSP (TH) 

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

), both payment systems
lead to the same GPs equilibrium strategies. As a result, Figures A and D coincide most
of the time. However, if the FFS nancial incentives are much greater (smaller) than the
fundholding nancial incentives, then the curves ea2 and ea3 which summarize the GPs equi-
librium strategies under the FFS system will be more to the right (left) than the curves ba2
and ba3 which summarize the GPs equilibrium strategies under the fundholding system.
Finally, recall that b is the value of  such that ba2 = ba3 = 1=2; i.e., the value of 
where the curves ba2 and ba3 intersect in Figure D. The fundholding equilibrium strategies
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can also be characterized with respect to the value of b. It can easily be shown that b ? 0
i¤ cSP (TH) 

cGP (T
L) + (1  p)cSP (TH)

? 0. Furthermore, if b is positive, it can also
be shown that b ? 1 i¤ cSP (TH)   cGP (TL) + (1  p)cSP (TH) ? (1   p)(n  m): As
a result, we must consider the cases where ba2 or ba3 may not gure in the (; a)   space
equal to [0; 1]  [1=2; 1] (i.e., where no physician will always treat or where no physician
will always refer).
Comparing the fundholding equilibrium to the First Best:
Scenario I: pA > (1  p)B
Under Scenario I, pA > (1   p)B; which is equivalent to the following condition:
cSP (T
H)   cGP (TL) + (1  p)cSP (TH) > (1   p)(n   m). That is, the cost concern
associated with wasteful referrals dominates the patients expected utility concern, or equiv-
alently, it is worse to make a Type I error than a Type II error. The scenario I condition
is more likely to be satised when the expected cost di¤erence is high, i.e., when cSP is
relatively large and/or the probability of a relatively severe illness (MH) is low. This con-
dition holds when comparing the fundholding equilibrium strategies to the First Best in
Figure E. Accordingly, under Scenario I, the only relevant equilibrium strategies are those
where no GP will ever wish to always refer (i.e., a^2 does not gure in the (; a)   space
equal to [0; 1] [1=2; 1] :
The fundholding equilibrium strategies coincide with the First Best in two regions. In
the rst region, when the GP has a generally low diagnostic ability (i.e., a < a), both
the fundholding and First-Best strategies are to systematically treat the patient with TL:
In the second region, when the GPs altruism and diagnostic ability are both relatively
high (or equivalently, a > ba3), both the fundholding and the First-Best strategies are to
follow the diagnostic signal. Finally, the fundholding strategies do not coincide with the
First Best in the remaining region labelled by (-). In this area, the fundholding GPs (who
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are both relatively selsh and have a relatively high diagnostic ability) will wish to always
treat the patient with TL while the First-Best strategy is to follow the diagnostic signal.
Thus, such fundholding GPs under-refer their patients to specialty care.
Further notice that under Scenario I, ba3 actually reaches a when  = 1: Thus, fully
altruistic physicians (i.e., as we dene them, GPs who equally weigh their income to their
patientshealth) will always behave in the First-Best manner, irrespective of their level of
diagnostic ability.
[Insert Figure E Here]
Scenario II:
Under Scenario II, pA < (1   p)B; which is equivalent to the following condition:
cSP (T
H) cGP (TL) + (1  p)cSP (TH) < (1 p)(n m). That is, the patients expected
utility concern (associated with the gross benet of being appropriately treated by a spe-
cialist when su¤ering from a relatively severe illness (MH)) dominates the cost concern,
or equivalently, it is worse to make a Type II error than a Type I error. The scenario
II condition is more likely to be satised when the expected cost di¤erence is small, i.e.,
when cSP is relatively small and/or the likelihood of a relatively severe illness is high. This
condition holds when comparing the fundholding equilibrium strategies to the First Best in
Figure F. Accordingly, under scenario II, a^2 will always gure in the relevant (; a) space
(i.e., there are always some GPs who will wish to always refer). However, comparing the
fundholding equilibrium strategies to the First Best when both ba2 and a^3 gure in the
relevant (; a)   space gives very similar results to those obtained when comparing the
FFS equilibrium strategies to the First Best. As a result, we will focus on the case where
a^3 does not gure in the relevant (; a) space (i.e., where no physician will wish to always
treat).
This particular case corresponds to the situation where the di¤erence between GPsand
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specialistscosts is non-signicant. In that case, the First-Best threshold value of the GPs
ability a tends to be equal to 1. Furthermore, Figure F clearly shows that the fundholding
strategies coincide with the First-Best in all but one region, i.e., the area labelled (-), and
they completely di¤er from the FFS strategies.
[Insert Figure F Here]
To summarize, fundholding payment systems often provide disincentive to refer by
having GPs pay for their patientsexpenses for specialty care. In particular, under Scenario
II, where it is worse to make a Type II error than it is to make a Type I error. As such,
insu¢ cient referrals should be avoided where under referrals are associated with relatively
selsh GPs. However, the opposite would occur in some specic cases, namely when the
di¤erence between cSP and cGP becomes non-signicant.
5 Comparing across the di¤erent payment mechanisms
In this section we turn our attention to comparing the three payment mechanisms examined
above. More specically, we examine for each type of GP (i.e., for each altruism/diagnostic-
ability pair (; a)) which payment system provides the best incentives. In order to do
so, we present the results from our analysis for each payment mechanism on a single
gure under both scenarios. More specically, in Figures G and H, we rank (using the 
symbol) the three payment mechanisms for all possible altruism/diagnostic-ability pairs
under Scenarios I and II, respectively. Furthermore, we index the payment mechanism
with a  symbol whenever its outcome coincides with the First Best.
By examining Figures G and H, one can see quite clearly that no payment mechanism
consistently outperforms any other. More specically, no payment mechanism weakly
dominates all others for all potential joint distributions of GP types (i.e., for all joint
distributions of  and a). It is nonetheless interesting to note that some general patterns
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do emerge.
Under Scenario I, recall that the cost concern associated with wasteful referrals domi-
nates the patients expected utility concern and that this scenario is more likely to occur
when the specialist costs csp are relatively high and/or the probability of a relatively severe
illness (MH) is low. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary referrals, the First-Best strat-
egy for GPs with low diagnostic ability (a < a) is to systematically treat their patients
whereas GPs with a relatively high diagnostic ability (a > a) should follow their diagnostic
signal. Under Scenario I (Figure G), the capitation system is (at least) weakly dominated
by both the FFS and the fundholding systems for all potential joint distributions of GP
types. This is simply because the capitation system provides incentives for GPs to system-
atically refer their patients. As a result, we can limit our analysis to comparing the FFS
to the fundholding case.
One interesting result is that for GPs with low levels of diagnostic ability (i.e., a < a),
the fundholding system weakly dominates the FFS system irrespective of the GPs level of
altruism. Thus, in this case, the fundholding system provides the bestincentives for GPs
and achieves a First-Best outcome for all GP types. This is so because, under Scenario I
where costs associated with wasteful referrals should be avoided, the fundholding system
eliminates the incentive to refer patients to specialty care by having the GP pay for the pa-
tients specialty-care expenses; whereas the FFS system provides su¢ ciently altruistic GPs
with nancial incentives to either follow their diagnostic signal or systematically refer their
patients to specialty care. Thus, the fundholding system can eliminate the perverse incen-
tive to over-refer associated with relatively high altruism in the presence of low diagnostic
ability.
When the joint distribution of GPs includes only individuals who have a relatively high
diagnostic ability (i.e., a > a), the FFS and fundholding systems both lead to di¤erent
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treatment and referral decisions and provide di¤erent incentives. More specically, the
FFS system tends to dominate the fundholding system. For instance, for GPs who have
intermediate levels of altruism (i.e., max fea3; a;ea2g < a < ba3); the fundholding system
provides GPs with a nancial disincentive to refer their patients to specialty care (in order
to avoid the costs associated with referrals) even though their diagnostic signal indicates
that they should in the First Best; whereas the FFS system provides GPs with the nancial
incentive to always follow their diagnostic signal (which is the First-Best strategy). Thus,
for those GPs, the FFS system stricly dominates the fundholding system.
Finally, it is interesting to note that as the FFS rewards of treatment RGP (TL)  
cGP (T
L) increases, the di¤erences between the nancial incentives provided by the FFS
and the fundholding systems tend to reduce. Consequently, the di¤erences in the results
obtained above, either for GPs with low diagnostic ability (a < a) or for GPs with high
diagnostic ability (a > a); will also tend to be reduced.
To sum up, under Scenario I, the FFS system generates the First-Best outcome for GPs
who are able and have intermediate levels of altruism. Conversely, the fundholding system
gives outcomes which are closer to the First Best for all other types of GPs.
[Insert Figure G Here]
Under Scenario II, recall that the patients expected utility concern dominates the cost
concern and that this scenario is more likely to occur when the expected cost di¤erence
(between specialists and GPs costs) is low and/or the likelihood of a relatively severe
illness is high. Therefore, in order to avoid insu¢ cient referrals, the First-Best strategy for
GPs with low diagnostic ability (a < a) is to systematically refer their patients whereas
GPs with high diagnostic ability (a > a) should follow their diagnostic signal.
Under Scenario II, the FFS and the fundholding systems induce very similar behaviors
and are therefore treated in the same way in Figure H. Here, no physician payment mech-
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anism weakly dominates any other. It is interesting to note, however, that for GPs with
relatively low diagnostic ability (a < a), the capitation payment system weakly dominates
both the FFS and the fundholding systems as the capitation strategy coincides with the
First Best. This is simply because under Scenario II, GPs with a low diagnostic ability
should always refer their patients to specialty care and the capitation payment system
provides them with the nancial incentives to do so.
For physicians with a relatively high level of diagnostic ability (a > a), the payment
mechanism which leads to the besttreatment and referral decisions depends on the GPs
level of altruism. For relatively low levels of altruism (a < a < ea3(a^3)), the capitation
payment system does best as it encourages GPs to systematically refer their patients
while both the fundholding and the FFS systems encourage GPs to systematically treat
their patients (recall that under Scenario II it is better to systematically refer the patient
to specialty care than to systematically treat her with TL). For GPs who have a relatively
higher level of altruism (i.e., a > maxfea3(a^3); a;ea2(a^2)g), the FFS and the fundholding
payment systems dominate the capitation system, as they provide the nancial incentives
for GPs to follow their diagnostic signal.
Last, FFS tends to induce more (less) referrals than the fundholding system if the FFS
margin RGP (TL)   cGP (TL) is low(high) enough compared to the expected di¤erence in
costs between a treatment by the specialist and the GP
 
cSP (T
H)  cGP (TL) + (1  p)cSP (TH).
However, as this expected cost di¤erence decreases or even becomes negative (i.e., where
very few or even no GP will wish to always treat), the fundholding nancial incentives will
induce GPs strategies which are similar to those induced by the capitation system. As a
result, in this case, the fundholding payment system leads to the First best for most GPs
with low diagnostic signal (a < a) and for all GPs with high diagnostic signal (a > a).
To sum up, under Scenario II, both FFS and fundholding generate the First-Best be-
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havior for GPs who are both able and altruistic enough. On the contrary, the capitation
system is closer to the First Best if the majority of GPs are rather selsh and/or unable.
[Insert Figure H Here]
Although no general conclusions can be drawn with respect to which payment mecha-
nism provides the bestnancial incentives for GPs, each one is weakly preferred under
particular situations. First, when it is better in expected utility terms to systematically
refer patients to specialty care than to systematically treat them (i.e., under Scenario II),
the capitation payment system provides the best incentives when GPs have relatively
low levels of diagnostic ability or have relatively low levels of altruism. When it is better
to systematically treat a patient than to systematically refer her (i.e., under Scenario I),
the FFS system does bestwhen GPs have relatively high levels of diagnostic precision
and intermediate levels of altruism. Because such GPs care su¢ ciently about their patients
and their income, they not only wish to rely on their diagnosis for nancial reasons but
can for altruistic ones. Finally, still under Scenario I, the fundholding system provides
the best incentives for GPs when they have low levels of diagnostic ability. This is simply
because the fundholding system encourages them to refer less than the other two payment
systems. Furthermore, when GPs are very altruistic but have relatively high levels of di-
agnostic ability, the fundholding system does best as it eliminates the perverse incentives
to over-refer when GPs are very altruistic.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some commonly used payment
mechanisms for GPs, namely FFS, capitation and fundholding. It brings important nuances
to the incentives already identied in the literature by focusing on gatekeeping GPs, by
explicitly recognizing that GPs are heterogeneous in both ability and altruism, and by
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introducing dynamics in the health production function.
We conclude that both FFS and fundholding usually result in less referrals to costly
specialty care than does capitation. This result contrasts with the cost-containment prop-
erty that is usually associated with capitation in the literature. The rationale behind our
result is that GPs under capitation are better o¤ referring all patients to specialty care
for the sake of both economizing on their own treatment expenses and improving their pa-
tientshealth. However, whenever the cost of having the patient referred to the specialist
is low enough relative to the expected costs of GPs care, then fundholding may induce
almost as much referrals as capitation, because GPs have little nancial incentives to treat
their patients directly.
We also show that, although driven by nancial incentives of di¤erent nature, the GPs
strategic outcomes associated with fundholding and those of FFS can be, surprisingly, very
much alike. More specically, only very altruistic yet not very able GPs will refer all their
patients to specialty care. GPs who are relatively altruistic and very able will decide to
either treat or refer according to their diagnostic ability. Last, the very selsh yet able
GPs will directly treat all their patients to either maximize their earnings under FFS or
minimize their expected expenses under fundholding.
Finally, whether a regulator should use one or another payment mechanism for GPs
depends on (i) his priorities which, in turn, depend on the expected cost di¤erence between
GPs care and specialty care, and (ii) the distribution of proles among GPs. For instance,
in the case where specialists costs are relatively high (which is often argued as the raison
dêtre of gatekeeping), our results suggest the following. If most GPs were very able and
relatively altruistic, the FFS system would be the most appropriate payment mechanism.
Conversely, if most GPs were less able yet altruistic, the fundholding system would give
the most appropriate incentives. However, an empirical evaluation of the distribution of
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GPs proles is denitely necessary before providing reliable policy recommendations.
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7 Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
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We assume the GPs are paid exactly the cost of treatment (i.e., we assume a perfectly
competitive environment where RGP (TL) = cGP (TL). We then solve for the patients
expected utility maximizing treatment and referral decisions given a diagnostic signal SL.
A GP who observes a diagnostic signal SL (given a diagnostic ability a) can treat the
patient with TL or refer the patient to the specialist. We next calculate the patients
expected utility under these two strategies.23
The GP treats the patient with TL
(a) With probability Pr(MLjSL), the patient su¤ers from ML and is treated by the
GP with TL: In this case the patients utility is:
u(h ML + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h ML + TL) + I):
(b) With probability Pr(MH jSL); the patient su¤ers from MH and is treated by the
GP with TL: In this case the patients expected utility is:
u(h MH + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h MH   L+ TH) + I   cHSP ):
Thus, the patients expected utility is:
pa
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)

u(h ML + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h ML + TL) + I)
	
+
(1  p)(1  a)
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)fu(h M
H + TL) + I   cLGP + (A1.1)
(u(h MH   L+ TH) + I   cHSP )g:
The GP refers the patient to the specialist:
(a) With probability Pr(MLjSL); the patient su¤ers from ML and is treated by the
23 Including the costs of treatment directly into the maximization problem is equivalent to maximizing
the patients expected utility subject to an actuarially fair insurance constraint.
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specialist with TL: In this case the patients utility is:
u(h ML + TL) + I   cLSP + (u(h ML + TL) + I):
(b) With probability Pr(MH jSL); the patient su¤ers from MH and is treated by the
specialist with TH . In this case the patients utility is:
u(h MH + TH) + I   cHSP + (u(h MH + TH) + I):
Thus, the patients expected utility is:
pa
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)

u(h ML + TL) + I   cLSP + (u(h ML + TL) + I)
	
+
(1  p)(1  a)
pa+ (1  p)(1  a)fu(h M
H + TH) + I   cHGP + (A1.2)
(u(h MH + TH) + I)g:
Thus, a GP who observes a diagnostic signal SH should treat the patient with TH
(should refer the patient to the specialist) i¤ (A1.1)  (<) (A1.2) or:
a  (<) (1  p)B
pA+ (1  p)B
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
We derive the rst-best treatment and referral strategies given a diagnostic signal SH .
A GP who observes a diagnostic signal SH (given a diagnostic ability a) can treat
the patient with TL or refer the patient to the specialist. We next calculate the patients
expected utility under these two strategies.
The GP treats the patient with TL:
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(a) With probability Pr(MLjSH), the patient su¤ers from ML and is treated by the
GP with TL: In this case the patients utility is:
u(h ML + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h ML + TL) + I):
(b) With probability Pr(MH jSH); the patient su¤ers from MH and is treated by the
GP with TL: In this case the patients expected utility is:
u(h MH + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h MH   L+ TH) + I   cHSP ):
Thus, the patients expected utility is:
p(1  a)
p(1  a) + (1  p)a

u(h ML + TL) + I   cLGP + (u(h ML + TL) + I)
	
+
(1  p)a
p(1  a) + (1  p)afu(h M
H + TL) + I   cLGP + (A2.1)
(u(h MH   L+ TH) + I   cHSP )g:
The GP refers the patient to the specialist:
(a) With probability Pr(MLjSH); the patient su¤ers from ML and is treated by the
specialist with TL: In this case, the patients utility is:
u(h ML + TL) + I   cLSP + (u(h ML + TL) + I):
(b) With probability Pr(MH jSH); the patient su¤ers from MH and is treated by the
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specialist with TH . In this case, the patients utility is:
u(h MH + TH) + I   cHSP + (u(h MH + TH) + I):
Thus, the patients expected utility is:
p(1  a)
p(1  a) + (1  p)a

u(h ML + TL) + I   cLSP + (u(h ML + TL) + I)
	
+
(1  p)a
p(1  a) + (1  p)afu(h M
H + TH) + I   cHSP + (A2.2)
(u(h MH + TH) + I)g:
Thus, a GP who observes a diagnostic signal SH should refer the patient to the specialist
(should treat the patient with TL) i¤ (A2.2)  (<) (A2.1) or:
a  (<) pA
pA+ (1  p)B
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
Recall from Lemma 1, that a GP who receives a diagnostic signal SL should refer the
patient to specialty care if a 2
h
1
2 ;
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B
i
and should treat the patient with TL when
a 2
h
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B ; 1
i
: However, pA > (1   p)B implies that (1 p)BpA+(1 p)B < 12 . Thus, the GP
should always treat the patient with TL when he receives a diagnostic signal SL (i.e., his
diagnostic ability is irrelevant).
Further recall from Lemma 2, that a GP who receives a diagnostic signal SH should
always treat his patient with TL when a 2
h
1
2 ;
pA
pA+(1 p)B
i
and should refer the patient to
specialty care when a 2
h
pA
pA+(1 p)B ; 1
i
: Thus, the GPs rst-best treatment and referral
decisions when he receives a diagnostic signal SH will depend on his diagnostic ability since
pA > (1  p)B implies that pApA+(1 p)B > 12
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
Recall from Lemma 2, that a GP who receives a diagnostic signal SH should treat his
patient with TL when a 2
h
1
2 ;
pA
pA+(1 p)B
i
and should refer the patient to specialty care
when e 2
h
p2A
p2A+p3B
; 1
i
: However, pA < (1   p)B implies that pApA+(1 p)B < 12 . Thus, the
GP should always refer the patient to the specialist when he receives a diagnostic signal
SH (i.e., his diagnostic ability is irrelevant).
Further recall from Lemma 1, that a GP who receives a diagnostic signal SL should refer
the patient to specialty care if a 2
h
1
2 ;
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B
i
and should treat the patient with TL
when a 2
h
(1 p)B
pA+(1 p)B ; 1
i
: Thus, the physicians rst-best treatment and referral decisions
when he receives a diagnostic signal SL will depend on his diagnostic ability since pA <
(1  p)B implies that (1 p)BpA+(1 p)B > 12
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